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Attorney for Appellant 
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In The S11preme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
PETE CASTILLO, 
Plain tiff-Respondent 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
11447 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
On April 12, 1968, the appellant was charged with the 
crime of assault with a deadly weapon in connection with the 
stabbing of his former wife, Caroline Castillo, on March 12, 
1968. The appellant was bound over and tried in the Third 
District Court for the crime accused. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After '.\ trial by jury which began on August 9, 1968, and 
concluded on August 12, 1968, the appellant was found guilty 
of assault with a deadly weapon. Motion was made for a new 
trial and was denied. This is an appeal from the conviction and 
denied motion. 
• 
:. 
RELIH:;-, SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The re$pondent seeks affirmation of the appellant's con-
viction and of the lower court's denial of his motion for new 
trial. 
Throughout this brief, references as to the Record will be 
designated R. Those pertaining to the Transcript will be desig-
nated TI or TU for the two volumes respectively. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent is in general agreement with the statement 
of facts as contained in the appellant's brief with the follow-
ing important exceptions, additions and alterations: 
I. Nc·t only did Santana Gonzales not want his sister to 
talk to the appellant, but Mrs. Castillo herself had expressed 
the same desire (TU",8,30). 
2. Appellant fails to mention in his statement of the facts 
that Santana Gonzales confirmed the testimony of Mrs. Castil-
lo as to how appellant first attacked Gonzales with a knife and 
as to how she was stabbed (Tl.30-32). 
3. Officer Clark's testimony as to the physical condition 
of the appellant after the incident (TI.60) can be used just as 
easily to corroborate the testimony of Santana Gonzales (Tl.30-
23). 
4. While appellant contends in his facts that there was 
"substantial testimony" of "mutual hostility", the record re-
flects that the testimony was far from substantial (TI.17,34), 
and that the hostility was more unilateral than mutual (Tl.3 5) · 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR TO THE PRE-
JUDICE OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT IN REFUS-
ING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO HIS THEORY 
OF THE CASE. 
A. Instructions must pertain to and be based upon evi-
dence presented. 
The time honored standard for determining the propriety 
of instructions given is whether the instructions given adequate-
ly relate to the evidence presented. In the case of People v. 
Cummings, 141 C.A.2d 193, 296 P.2d 610 (1956) which in-
volved an attempt to commit an abortion, the California court 
expressed this fundamental doctrine: 
"While it is well settled that a defendant is en-
titled to instructions based on the theory of his de-
fense, the court may refuse proffered instructions on 
a theory that i5 not supported by substantial evi-
dence." 
While there is a judicial split as to the amount of evidence 
needed to warrant an instruction, some courts saying any evi-
dence, others calling for substantial evidence, the trend seems 
to require substantial evidence. 
In State v. Mosley, 75 N.M. 348, 404 P.2d 304 ( 1965) 
the New Mexico Supreme Court echoed the California decision 
in the Cummings case. supra, in holding: 
" ... it is well established that the court is not 
required to charge the jury on the defendant's theory 
of the case unless it is supported bv substantial evi-
dence." 
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This same court m State u. Romero, 73 N.M. 109, 385 
P.2d 967 ( 1963) earlier said that the refusal of requested in-
structions on the doctrine of self-defense is proper where the 
evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the 
crime charged was committed in self-defense. 
Can it be said, regarding the instant case, that the evi-
dence presented was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as w 
whether the crime charged ·was committed in self-defense? Per-
haps the Romaro case provides the clue as to what the courts 
mean by "substantial evidence." 
This ''substantial evidence" test appears to be the standard 
used by Ut2ch courts also. In the case of Stat<' 1·s. fohnson, 112 
Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947) which involved the defensr 
of self-defense in a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, 
this Court said: 
"It is admitted that the defendant is entitled to 
have the jury instructed on his theory of the case if 
there is any substantial evidence to justify giving such 
an instruction. However, when the legislature permits 
a defendant to avoid the consequences of his act be-
cause the killing was excusable, an instruction is not 
necessary unless the facts and circumstances impelling 
the accused to act are in some way consistent with the 
legislative intent to excuse." 
In the earlier case of State vs. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 
P.2d 290 ( 1943) this Court seems to have added an addition-
ally required ingredient, that of competence. In that case, the 
Court said that each party is entitled to hwe his theorv of the 
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case, if supported by competent evidence, submitted to the jury 
by appropriate instructions. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the test of sub-
stantiality and competence of evidence must be met before prof-
fered instructions can be appropriately presented to the jury. 
B. No substantial or competent evidence was presented 
as to appelbnt'-; theory of the case, i.e., self-defense. 
There was no evidence presented on behalf of the appellant 
as to how he supposes his former wife was stabbed. 
By his own testimony, the appellant concedes his inability 
to relate what he claims must have happened. He states, "After 
that, I don'.- rcmemher much if I struggled with the knife or 
how I took the knife away from him, or stabbing my wife or 
stabbing him" (Til.14). 
He was then asked, "And after you saw him coming at 
you with a knife, what do you rememer next?" (Til.15). 
He answered, "Well, the next thing I remember was that 
I was on top of him and he was asking me not to hurt him any 
more" (Til.15). 
Appellant would have us believe that because he cannot 
remember how his former wife was stabbed, it must have been 
accidential during an act of self-defense. 
It can hardly he contended that such a theory is substan-
tial by either substantial or competent evidence. 
The appellant foils to recall any intervention on the part 
of his wife. Thus, while by his own testimony he attempts to 
bridge the gap of self-defense against Santana Gonzales, the 
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second and most expansive gap, that of the accidential stabbing 
of his former wife, alludes him completely and remains unex-
plained. 
While there is evidence, the competence of which is high-
ly questionable, that the appellant was defending himself against 
an attack by the victim's brother, there is no evidence whatso-
ever that the victim herself was stabbed during such a defense. 
And while it is conceivable that a third person might be acci-
dentally cut during such an alleges affray, it is difficult to 
imagine an accidental stabbing as serious as that inflicted upon 
Mrs. Castillo. 
As has been said, the evidence must be competent to merit 
any related instruction. The competence of the appellant's own 
testimony must be weighed in light of the predicament in which 
he finds himself. Certainly that portion of the appellant's testi-
mony which portrayed the instrument of the stabbing being 
mysteriously transferred from his own pocket to his alleged 
attacker's hand and then just as mysteriously back to his own, 
contributed little to the competence of his testimony (TII.21, 
22). 
The competence of the appellant's testimony also wears a 
little thin in his attempt to explain who ended up with the 
knife (Compare TII.15 with TII.22). 
It is conceded that while the jury is normally the weigher 
of fact, certainly the judge as the giver of the law must init-
ially weigh the evidence presented to determine which law by 
way of instruction need be given the jury. In essence, it would 
appear that the specificity with which instructions are to be 
given the jury depends on the degree to which the evidence 
presented warrants mch instructions. 
C. Appellant's proposed instruct10ns were faulty in their 
statement o{ the law. 
With reference to the proposed instructions at R.34 and 
R.3 5, it cannot go without note that the retreat doctrine as 
limited there only applies if the appellant at the time of the 
alleged self-defense is in a place where he has a lawful right to 
be. The transcript indicates he barged into a private dwelling 
against the expressed desires of the inhabitants (TI.15) . See 
People v. Zuckerman, 56 C.A.2d 366, 132 P.2d 545 (1942) and 
People v. McDonnel, 94 C.A.2d 885, 211 P.2d 910 (1949). 
In this same regard, the law is resplendent with cases which hold 
that the claimant of self-defense must be free from fault in 
bringing on the difficulty. 
With respect to the proposed instruction at R.36, while 
this instruction may be partially correct, such anticipation must 
be reasonable. There is nothing in the record to show that prior 
to the visit by the appellant to the victim's home that her 
brother had propensities for violence. On the contrary, there 
is evidence that Santana Gonzales made every effort to avoid 
such violence (Tl.3 5). 
This instruction was also faulty in that it should have stat-
ed that arms used in the advanced arming of oneself may not 
be of a type, the natural use of which would have exceeded the 
force necessary to repel or defend against the anticipated attack. 
Proposed Instruction at R.37, The instruction as proposed 
only requires the defendant to come forward with "some" evi-
dence to avail himself of the defense. The cases cited thus. far in 
this brief indicate that "substantial and competent" evidence 
is required. 
While that portion of the closing sentence of the instruc-
tion which states that if a reasonable doubt exists as to whether 
defendant did not act m self-defense, he should be acquitted. 
is an accurate statement of the law, it can hardly be conceded 
that if a reasonable doubt exists as to whether defendant did 
act in self-defense, he should be acquitted. The latter is simply 
an inaccurate statement of the law. 
Proposed Instruction at R.39. This instruction suffers from 
the same defect as the Instruction at R.37. Appellant would 
have the jury believe that if they" ... should have a reasonable 
doubt ... that the defendant was lawfully endeavoring to de-
fend himself ... and that he had had no intent ... " (emphasis 
added) they must aquit him. The standard for acquittal is 
reasonable doubt as to quilt not as to innocence. 
Proposed Instruction at R.41. The appellant makes the 
statement, "If you should have a reasonable doubt as to whether 
defendant's theory of this case is true you should acquit him." 
(Emphasis added.) Again we have a request for aquittal if 
reasonable doubt exists as to defendant's innocence. 
While it is admitted that many of these objections to the 
proposed instructions are somewhat technical, when considered 
in connection with the lack of supporting evidence it is not 
difficult to appreciate the court's ruling as to such instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
The universal standard which governs the basis for and the 
propriety of giving instructions to the jury in a criminal case 
is the existence of substantial and competent evidence to support 
such instructions. The record in this instance fails to reflect 
the productions of either substantial or competent evidence suf-
ficient to support the giving of appellant's proposed instruc-
tions. In addition, the instructions themselves are repleat with 
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half-statements and misstatements of the law sufficient to 
cause their rejection. It is submitted that the evidence presented 
required no more than the giving of a general instruction as to 
"just cause or excuse," and that the rejection of appellant's pro-
posed instructions was in no way inappropriate. Eor these rea-
sons, it is further submitted that the lower court's judgment 
and conviction be affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Assistant Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
CLARE A. JONES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
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